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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since the Supreme Court held state-sponsored prayer and Bible-reading 
in the public schools to violate the First Amendment in Engel v. Vitale, 
370 U.S. 421 (1962) and Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 
(1963), literally hundreds of constitutional amendments have been proposed 
in Congress to overturn those decisions. On May 17, 1982, President Reagan 
sent to Congress his recommended amendment--the first time a President has 
made such a proposal on the matter. His proposal provides as follows: 
Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit 
individual or group prayer in public schools or other public 
institutions. No person shall be required by the United 
States or by any State to participate in prayer. 
This report notes that the Supreme Court has interpreted the First 
Amendment to bar the government from using, or permitting others to use, 
the public schools as instruments of inculcating religious faith or belief, 
but that it has found some accommodations with religion to be permissible 
and even, in the college context, compelled. The report further notes that 
on issues not yet adjudicated by the Supreme Court, the state and lower 
federal courts have uniformly held the First Amendment to permit government 
to sponsor periods for silent meditation and to accommodate baccalaureate 
services and commencement prayers in connection with graduation exercises, 
but have also uniformly held unconstitutional government accommodation of 
student-initiated prayer groups in public secondary schools. In addition, 
the report notes that outside of the public school context, the Supreme 
Court has found constitutional government involvement with religion in 
prisons and, by implication, in the military, and that state and lower federal 
courts have uniformly held constitutional the use of prayer to open meetings 
of legislative bodies. In other contexts, however, governmental involvement 
with prayer or affirmations of belief have been held unconstitutional. 
In this legal context the report finds that the language of the 
Presidentf s proposal would not change those existing interpretations of 
the First Amendment which either have not specifically involved prayer or 
have upheld government involvement with prayer in a particular context. 
The report further finds that because the proposal speaks only in terms of 
"individual or group prayer" and not of government sponsorship or other 
involvement, its effect on those interpretations of the First Amendment 
which have held government involvement with prayer in the public schools 
unconstitutional to be uncertain. In addition, the report finds that even 
if the element of government involvement with prayer is read into the 
proposal (as seems its intent), it remains unclear whether the proposal 
would legitimize all, or only some, of the various forms of government 
involvement with prayer in the public schools that have heretofore been 
struck down. The report further finds that the same uncertainty attends 
the question of the proposal's effect on government involvement with prayer 
in public institutions other than the schools. Finally, the report 
notes that the second sentence of the proposal would not change 
existing interpretations of the First Amendment but would assure 
that the first sentence would not be interpreted to legitimize 
governmental coercion of religious affirmation. 
The report also includes a reprise of past Congressional action 
on proposed constitutional amendments relating to school prayer, noting 
that majorities in both the House and Senate have in different Congresses 
voted for such proposals but that the necessary two-thirds majority was 
obtained only once and then apparently as part of a strategy to defeat a 
proposed "Equal Rights Amendment" by encumbering it with extraneous 
amendments. 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S 
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ON SCHOOL PRAYER 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 17, 1982, P r e s i d e n t  Reagan recommended t o  Congress t h a t  
t h e  fo l lowing  language be added a s  an amendment t o  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n :  
Nothing i n  t h i s  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h a l l  be cons t rued  t o  
p r o h i b i t  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  group p raye r  i n  p u b l i c  s choo l s  
o r  o t h e r  p u b l i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  No person  s h a l l  be 
r e q u i r e d  by t h e  United S t a t e s  o r  by any S t a t e  t o  
p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  prayer .  - 1/ 
I n  a  message accompanying t h e  proposa l ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  
purpose of  t h e  proposa l  was " t o  r e s t o r e  t h e  s imple  freedom of our  
c i t i z e n s  t o  o f f e r  p raye r  i n  our  p u b l i c  s choo l s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s " :  
The amendment I propose w i l l  remove t h e  ba r  t o  s choo l  
p raye r  e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  Supreme Court and a l low 
p r a y e r  back i n  ou r  s choo l s .  128 Cong. Rec. S5334 
(May 17, 1982). 
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  s t a t e d  t h a t  h i s  proposa l  would no t  compel 
anyone t o  engage i n  p raye r  bu t  would "al low communities t o  de termine  
f o r  themselves whether p raye r  should  be pe rmi t t ed  i n  t h e i r  pub l i c  
s choo l s  and. . .a l low i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  dec ide  f o r  themselves whether t hey  
2  / -
wish t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  prayer ."  
T h i s  r e p o r t  s e t s  f o r t h  t h e  l e g a l  c o n t e x t  of t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  
1/ Subsequently,  t h e  proposed language was in t roduced  a s  S. J. - 
Res. 199 by Sena to r s  Thunnond and Hatch and I1.J. Res. 493 by Represent-  
a t i v e s  Kindness,  L o t t ,  and Beard. See 128 Cong. Rec. S5428 (May 18, 1982) 
( d a i l y  e d i t i o n )  and H2852 (May 25, 1982) (da i ly  e d i t i o n ) ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
2 1  The f u l l  t e x t  of  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  message i s  p r i n t e d  a s  an  
~ ~ ~ e n z i x  t o  t h i s  r e p o r t .  
proposal, analyzes the legal scope and effect of the proposed language, 
and briefly sketches past Congressional action on proposed constitutional 
amendments relating to school prayer. 
LEGAL CONTEXT 
The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof...." As worded, the establishment and free 
exercise clauses are applicable only to the federal government, but 
in the 1940's the Supreme Court held them to be part of the meaning 
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus to 
3 / -
apply to the states as well. Since that time the Court has on 
seven occasions addressed the meaning of these clauses with respect 
to the constitutionality of government involvement with religious 
activities in the public schools and on one occasion regarding 
religious activities in prisons. State and lower federal courts 
have further elaborated on their meaning in other situations relevant 
to the President's proposal. The following subsections detail this 
legal context. 
(1) Supreme Court Decisions Concerning Religious Activities in 
the Public Schools: Not all of the Court's decisions in this area 
directly concern the subject of President Reagan's proposal, that 
is, prayer in public schools and institutions. But cumulatively 
they provide the basic interpretation of the religion clauses 
of the First Amendment which, in part, the President's proposal 
appears intended to reverse. 
3 /  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)(free exercise); 
~verson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) (establishment). 
Five of the Court's seven decisions have held government sponsorship 
or sanction of particular religious activities in the public schools to 
violate the establishment of religion clause. In McCollum v. Board of 
4 I 
 ducati ion the Court held unconstitutional, 8-1, a "shared time" 
program in which local schools permitted private teachers to come into 
the schools to give religious instruction to consenting students during 
the school day. The Court stated: 
The...facts...show the use of tarsupported 
property for religious instruction and the 
close cooperation between the school authorities 
and the religious council in promoting religious 
education. The operation of the State's 
compulsory education system thus assists and is 
integrated with the program of religious 
instruction carried on by separate religious 
sects....This is beyond all question a 
utilization of the tarestablished and tax- 
supported public school system to aid religious 
groups to spread their faith. And it falls 
squarely under the ban of the First Amendment.... 
333 U.S. at 209-210. 
5 I 
Subsequently, in Engel v.  ita ale and the companion cases of 
6 I 
Abington School District v. Schempp and Murray v. ~ u r l e t t  he 
Court held unconstitutional, by 6-1 and 8-1 majorities, respectively, 
state sponsorship of such devotional activities as prayer and 
Bible reading in the public schools, notwithstanding provisions 
for the excusal of students who did not wish to take part. In 
Engel the school invited students and teachers to join in daily 
recital of a prayer composed by the New York State Board of Regents, 
while in Abington and Murray selections from the Bible were read 
4 /  333 U.S. 203 (1948). - 
51 370 U.S. 421 (1962). - 
and s t u d e n t s  and t eachers  were i n v i t e d  t o  j o i n  i n  unison r e c i t a l  
of t h e  Lord's  Prayer.  The s t a t e ' s  sponsorship of these  a c t i v i t i e s ,  
the  Court held ,  v i o l a t e d  " the  command of the  F i r s t  Amendment t h a t  
t h e  government mainta in  s t r i c t  n e u t r a l i t y ,  n e i t h e r  a id ing  nor opposing 
7 / 
r e l i g i o n .  "- Writ ing f o r  t h e  Court i n  Engel, J u s t i c e  Black s t a t e d :  
... t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o h i b i t i o n  aga ins t  laws 
r e s p e c t i n g  an es tabl ishment  of r e l i g i o n  must a t  
l e a s t  mean t h a t  i n  t h i s  country i t  i s  no p a r t  
of  t h e  business  of government t o  compose o f f i c i a l  
prayers  f o r  any group of the  American people t o  
r e c i t e  a s  a  p a r t  of a  r e l i g i o u s  program c a r r i e d  on 
by government. 370 U.S. a t  425. 
And i n  Abington J u s t i c e  Clark,  w r i t i n g  f o r  t h e  Court, i n t e r p r e t e d  
t h e  F i r s t  Amendment t o  impose a  "wholesome n e u t r a l i t y "  on government 
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  r e l i g i o n  which bars  i t  from placing i t s  " o f f i c i a l  
suppor t  ... behind the  t e n e t s  of one o r  a l l  orthodoxies" a s  we l l  a s  
from i n t e r f e r i n g  with " the  r i g h t  of every person t o  f r e e l y  choose 
8  / -
h i s  own course  with re fe rence  the re to . "  
9  / 
I n  Epperson v. ~ r k a n s a s  the  Court unanimously s t r u c k  down a  
s t a t e  s t a t u t e  which imposed c i v i l  and c r imina l  p e n a l t i e s  on a  pub l i c  
school  t eacher  who gave i n s t r u c t i o n  on the  theory of evolut ion.  
The Court found t h a t  the  s o l e  purpose of the  s t a t u t e  was t o  "b lo t  out  
a  p a r t i c u l a r  theory (of  c r e a t i o n )  because of i t s  supposed c o n f l i c t  
wi th  the  B i b l i c a l  account,  l i t e r a l l y  read":  
No suggest ion has been made t h a t  Arkansas law may be 
j u s t i f i e d  by cons ide ra t ions  of s t a t e  pol icy  o the r  than 
t h e  r e l i g i o u s  views of some of  i t s  c i t i z e n s .  It i s  
c l e a r  t h a t  fundamental is t  s e c t a r i a n  convic t ion was and 
i s  t h e  law's reason f o r  ex i s t ence .  393 U.S. a t  107-108. 
7 1  Id . ,  a t  225. - - 
81  Id . ,  a t  222. - - 
9 /  393 U . S .  97 (1968). - 
S t a t i n g  t h a t  " the  F i r s t  Amendment does not permit the  S t a t e  t o  r e q u i r e  
t h a t  teaching and l ea rn ing  be t a i l o r e d  t o  the  p r i n c i p l e s  o r  p r o h i b i t i o n s  
101 -
o f  any r e l i g i o u s  s e c t  o r  dogma," t h e  Court s t r u c k  down t h e  s t a t u t e .  
11 I 
More r e c e n t l y ,  i n  Stone v. ~raham- the  Court held  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  
5-4, a  s t a t e  s t a t u t e  which required t h a t  a  copy of the  Ten Commandments, 
purchased wi th  p r i v a t e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  be posted on t h e  w a l l  of each pub l i c  
classroom i n  t h e  s t a t e .  The Court found t h e  "p reeminen t  purpose" of t h e  
pos t ing  requirement t o  be "p la in ly  r e l i g i o u s  i n  nature ,"  notwi ths tanding 
con t ra ry  d e c l a r a t i o n s  by t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e .  A s  a  consequence, the  Court 
h e l d  t h a t  t h e  "mere post ing of t h e  copies  under t h e  auspices  of t h e  
l e g i s l a t u r e  provides t h e  ' o f f i c i a l  support  of the  State...Governmentl t h a t  
12 I -
the  Establishment Clause p roh ib i t s . "  
On t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e  Court has held  government involvement wi th  
r e l i g i o u s  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  pub l i c  schools i n  two ins tances  no t  t o  v i o l a t e  -
13 I 
t h e  F i r s t  Amendment. I n  Zorach v.  lau us on- the  Court, i n  a  6-3 d e c i s i o n ,  
upheld a s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a  l o c a l  " re leased time" program i n  which pub l i c  
school c h i l d r e n  whose pa ren t s  so  requested were permitted t o  l eave  t h e  
schoolgrounds during t h e  school day t o  r e c e i v e  r e l i g i o u s  i n s t r u c t i o n  from 
p r i v a t e  t eachers  i n  nearby p r i v a t e  f a c i l i t i e s .  D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  t h e  
program from t h e  "shared time" program s t r u c k  down i n  McCollum, supra ,  t h e  
Court s t a t e d :  
I n  t h e  McCollum c a s e  t h e  c lass rooms were used f o r  
r e l i g i o u s  i n s t r u c t i o n  and t h e  f o r c e  of t h e  p u b l i c  
s choo l  was used t o  promote t h a t  i n s t r u c t i o n .  Here, 
as we have s a i d ,  t h e  p u b l i c  s c h o o l s  do no more than  
accommodate t h e i r  s chedu le s  t o  a  program of o u t s i d e  
r e l i g i o u s  i n s t r u c t i o n .  343 U.S. a t  315. 
The F i r s t  Amendment, J u s t i c e  Douglas wrote f o r  t h e  Court,  r e q u i r e s  a  
"complete and unequivocal"  s e p a r a t i o n  of church and s t a t e ,  but  i t  does 
no t  r e q u i r e  t h a t  " t h e  government show a  c a l l o u s  i n d i f f e r e n c e  t o  r e l i g i o u s  
14 I -
groups" : 
When t h e  s t a t e  encourages r e l i g i o u s  i n s t r u c t i o n  o r  
c o o p e r a t e s  w i t h  r e l i g i o u s  a u t h o r i t i e s  by a d j u s t i n g  
t h e  schedu le  o f  p u b l i c  e v e n t s  t o  s e c t a r i a n  needs,  i t  
fo l lows  t h e  b e s t  of ou r  t r a d i t i o n s .  For i t  then  
r e s p e c t s  t h e  r e l i g i o u s  n a t u r e  of  our  people and 
accommodates t h e  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  t o  t h e i r  s p i r i t u a l  
needs.  Government may no t  f i n a n c e  r e l i g i o u s  groups 
no r  under take  r e l i g i o u s  i n s t r u c t i o n  nor blend s e c u l a r  
and s e c t a r i a n  educa t ion  no r  use  s e c u l a r  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
t o  f o r c e  one o r  some r e l i g i o n  on any person.  ... But i t  
can  c l o s e  i t s  doors  o r  suspend i t s  o p e r a t i o n s  a s  t o  
t h o s e  who want t o  r e p a i r  t o  t h e i r  r e l i g i o u s  s a n c t u a r y  
f o r  worship o r  i n s t r u c t i o n .  No more than  t h a t  i s  
under taken  he re .  343 U.S .  a t  313-14. 
15 I 
Most r e c e n t l y ,  t h e  Court i n  Widmar v.  inc cent- h e l d ,  8-1, t h a t  
a  p u b l i c  u n i v e r s i t y  which r o u t i n e l y  pe rmi t s  s t u d e n t  groups t o  u se  
campus f a c i l i t i e s  may no t  b a r  such groups from us ing  t h e  f a c i l i t i e s  
f o r  r e l i g i o u s  worship and d i s c u s s i o n .  Such content-based d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  
t h e  Court  s t a t e d ,  v i o l a t e d  t h e  s t u d e n t s '  r i g h t  of f r e e  speech under t h e  
F i r s t  and Four t een th  Amendment. The u n i v e r s i t y  argued t h a t  conformance 
w i t h  t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  of  church and s t a t e  mandated by t h e  e s t ab l i shmen t  
c l a u s e  c o n s t i t u t e d  a compell ing p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  o v e r r i d e  
t h e  s t u d e n t s '  i n t e r e s t s ,  bu t  t h e  Court r e fused  t o  ag ree  t h a t  a  p o l i c y  
of accommodation would either place the imprimatur of university 
sponsorship on the religious activities or single out religious 
groups for any special benefits. The Court concluded: 
Having created a forum generally open to student 
groups, the University seeks to enforce a content- 
based exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary 
policy violates the fundamental principle that a 
state regulation of speech should be content- 
neutral, and the University is unable to justify 
this violation under applicable constitutional 
standards. 102 S. Ct. at 278. 
In sum, the Court has interpreted the religion clauses of the 
161 -
First Amendment to impose on government a "wholesome neutrality" 
with respect to religion in the public schools. The Court has made 
clear that not all government action relating to religion in the 
public schools is constitutionally forbidden. It has upheld the 
constitutional permissibility of "released time" programs. It has 
held in the college context, that student groups are constitutionally 
entitled to use campus facilities for religious purposes to the same 
extent as for other purposes. In dicta it has affirmed the 
-- 
17 I 
constitutionality of the public schools offering courses about religion- 
and providing opportunities for students to take part in ceremonial 
or patriotic exercises which may incidentally involve a profession of 
181 -
faith but are not essentially devotional. 
But the Court has also made clear that the First Amendment bars 
government from using the public schools as an instrument of inculcating 
161 Abington, supra, -
17/ Stone v. Graham - -9 
181 Engel, supra, at -
at 222. 
supra, at 42. 
421, ftnt. 21. 
r e l i g i o u s  f a i t h  o r  b e l i e f .  It has  h e l d  t h a t  government may not  i t s e l f  
sponsor  d e v o t i o n a l  a c t i v i t i e s  a s  a  r e g u l a r  p a r t  of t h e  school  day, nor  
t a i l o r  t h e  cu r r i cu lum t o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o r  p r o h i b i t i o n s  of any p a r t i c u l a r  
r e l i g i o u s  s e c t  o r  dogma. It has  f u r t h e r  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  F i r s t  Amendment 
b a r s  t h e  government from p e r m i t t i n g  p r i v a t e  i n t e r e s t s  t o  use  t h e  schoo l  
premises  f o r  r e l i g i o u s  i n s t r u c t i o n  du r ing  t h e  school  day. 
". . . (T)he command of t h e  F i r s t  Amendment," t h e  Court has  s a i d ,  " ( i s )  
t h a t  t h e  Government ma in ta in  s t r i c t  n e u t r a l i t y ,  n e i t h e r  a i d i n g  nor  
19 I -
oppos ing  r e l i g i o n . "  
( 2 )  S t a t e  and Lower F e d e r a l  Court  Dec i s ions  on Other  School P raye r  
S i t u a t i o n s :  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  e n f o r c i n g  t h e  Supreme Cour t ' s  r u l i n g s  i n  f a c t  
s i t u a t i o n s  s i m i l a r  o r  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h o s e  above, t h e  s t a t e  and lower f e d e r a l  
c o u r t s  have i n t e r p r e t e d  t h e  e s t ab l i shmen t  and f r e e  e x e r c i s e  c l a u s e s  i n  
s e v e r a l  s i t u a t i o n s  invo lv ing  p raye r  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  s choo l s  not  y e t  
a d j u d i c a t e d  by t h e  Court.  Among those  s t a t e  and lower f e d e r a l  c o u r t  
a d j u d i c a t i o n s ,  t h e  fo l lowing  t h r e e  a r e a s  appear  d i r e c t l y  p e r t i n e n t  t o  
P r e s i d e n t  Reagan's p roposa l  : 
( a )  S i l e n t  med i t a t ion :  J u s t i c e  Brennan, i n  a  concurr ing  op in ion  
i n  Abington,  opined  t h a t  t h e r e  was no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o b j e c t i o n  t o  
t h e  p u b l i c  s c h o o l s  obse rv ing  " a  moment of r e v e r e n t  s i l e n c e "  a t  t h e  
201 -
beg inn ing  of  each  schoo l  day,  and t h e  New Hampshire Supreme Court 
h a s  on two occas ions  advised  t h e  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t u r e  t h a t  s t a t u t e s  
p r e s c r i b i n g  a  pe r iod  f o r  s i l e n t  med i t a t ion  a t  t h e  beginning of each  
191 Abington, sup ra ,  a t  225. - 
201 Abington, sup ra ,  a t  280-81 (Brennan, J., concur r ing ) .  -
21/ -
s c h o o l  day would be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .  But t h e  m a t t e r  ha s  been fo rma l ly  
a d j u d i c a t e d  i n  o n l y  a  s i n g l e  ca se .  
22 / 
I n  Gaines v. ~ n d e r s o n -  a  th ree- judge  f e d e r a l  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  upheld 
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  of a  s t a t e  s t a t u t e  p r e s c r i b i n g  a pe r iod  of  s i l e n c e  
" f o r  m e d i t a t i o n  o r  p raye r "  a t  t h e  beginning  of  each  schoo l  day. The 
c o u r t  found t h e  p r e s c r i p t i o n  of a moment of s i l e n c e  t o  s e r v e  such  
p e r m i s s i b l e  s e c u l a r  and non- re l i g ious  purposes  a s  s t i l l i n g  t h e  tumul t  
of t h e  playground and i n c u l c a t i n g  s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e  and r e s p e c t  f o r  
a u t h o r i t y .  The c o u r t  f u r t h e r  found m e d i t a t i o n  t o  be "not  n e c e s s a r i l y  
a  r e l i g i o u s  e x e r c i s e "  and he ld  t h a t  t h e  a d d i t i o n  of t h e  ph ra se  "o r  p raye r "  
t o  t h e  s t a t u t e  d i d  no more t han  r e f l e c t  a  " l e g i s l a t i v e  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  
t h e  F i r s t  Amendment's mandate t o  t a k e  a  n e u t r a l  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  n e i t h e r  
23 / 
encourages  no r  d i s cou rages  p raye r .  "- Thus, t h e  c o u r t  found no 
24 / -
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h e  s t a t u t e .  
( b )  Bacca l au rea t e  s e r v i c e s  and commencement p raye r s :  S i m i l a r l y ,  
s t a t e  and lower f e d e r a l  c o u r t s  have found no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o b j e c t i o n  
t o  t h e  h o l d i n g  of s e c t a r i a n  b a c c a l a u r e a t e  s e r v i c e s  o r  t o  t h e  i n c l u s i o n  
of  i n v o c a t i o n s  and b e n e d i c t i o n s  i n  commencement ceremonies r e l a t i n g  t o  
21/  Opinion o f  t h e  J u s t i c e s ,  108 N.H. 97, 228 A. 2d 1 6 1  (1967) and 
o p i n i o n  of  t h e  J u s t i c e s ,  113 N.H. 297, 307 A. 2d 558 (1973). 
22 /  421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976). 
24/  It might be noted  t h a t  21 s t a t e s  have now adopted s t a t u t e s  
r e q u i r i n g  o r  p e r m i t t i n g  moments of s i l e n t  m e d i t a t i o n .  See CRS, " S t a t e  
S t a t u t e s  R e l a t i n g  To P raye r  and B ib l e  Reading i n  t h e  P u b l i c  Schools  A t  
t h e  Time Of, and Subsequent To, Engel  and Abington" ( A p r i l  1, 1982).  
CRS- 10 
25 / -
graduation from public schools. The courts have uniformly held 
government's involvement with religion in these circumstances to be so 
attenuated as to be de minimis. As one court has stated: -
There is none of the repetitive or pedagogical 
function of the exercises which characterized the 
school prayer cases. There is no element of 
calculated indoctrination...The event, in short, 
is so fleeting that no significant transfer of 
government prestige can be anticipated. There 
is no state financial outlay and the Court cannot 
visualize the organs of state government becoming 
infected by a divisive religious battle for 
control of this brief and transient exercise. 
Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285, 289 
(E.D. Va. 1974). 
(c) Student-initiated prayer groups: In contrast to the foregoing, 
the state and lower federal courts that have addressed the issue have 
uniformly concurred that the use of public elementary and secondary 
school facilities at student initiative for religious purposes is 
unconstitutional. In two of the cases the courts have found school 
officials rather than students to be the initiating force behind the 
devotional meetings and thus have found the cases controlled by 
26 I -
Engel and Abington. In two others the courts have found the 
students to be the initiators of the religious activity but have 
found the mode of the activity to be so intertwined with the school 
251 Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township School District, 342 F. Supp. 1293 
W.D. Pa. 1972); Goodwin v. Cross County School District No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 
417 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 
1974); Chamberlin v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction, 143 So. 2d 
21 (Fla. l962), vacated and remanded 377 U.S. 402 (l963), previous 
opinion reinstated 160 So. 2d 97 (Fla.), reversed in part, dismissed in 
part 377 U.S. 402 (1964), on remand 171 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1965). -
261 State Board of Education v. Board of Education, Netcong, New 
~ e r s e E  108 N.J. Sup. 586, 
(1970), cert. den. 401 U.S. 
School committee of Leyden, 
404 U.S. 849 (1971). 
- -- - 
aff'd 57 N.J. 172, 270 A. 
Commissioner of Education 






program a s  t o  connote s t a t e  sponsorship.  But i n  th ree  cases  s t a t e  
and f e d e r a l  a p p e l l a t e  c o u r t s  have found the  s tuden t s  t o  be the  i n i t i a t o r s  
of group devot ional  meetings ye t  nonetheless  have held t h e  imprimatur 
of s t a t e  sponsorship given the  a c t i v i t i e s  by t h e  " i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  
coerc ive"  s e t t i n g  of the  pub l i c  schools,  the  s u b s i d i e s  involved i n  t h e  
groups' use of school f a c i l i t i e s ,  and/or the  involvement of school 
o f f i c i a l s  i n  supervis ing the  a c t i v i t i e s  t o  br ing the  a c t i v i t e s  wi th in  
281 -
t h e  p r o s c r i p t i o n s  of t h e  es tabl ishment  c lause .  These c o u r t s  have 
a l s o  uniformly held  s tuden t s '  claims based on t h e  f r e e  e x e r c i s e ,  f r e e  
speech, and equal  p ro tec t ion  c lauses  t o  be unavai l ing aga ins t  t h e s e  
es tabl ishment  c l ause  cons ide ra t ions .  A s  t h e  United S t a t e s  Court of 
Appeals f o r  the  Second C i r c u i t  s t a t e d  i n  t h e  most r ecen t  case:  
Two s i g n i f i c a n t  f ac to r s . . . de fea t  the  claims.  F i r s t ,  a  
high school i s  not  a  "public forum" where r e l i g i o u s  
views can be f r e e l y  a i r e d  .... Equally compelling, t h e  
s tuden t s  i n  t h i s  case  propose t o  conduct p rayer  
meetings i n  t h e  h igh school,  not  merely d i scuss ions  
about r e l i g i o u s  mat ters .  When t h e  e x p l i c i t  
Establishment Clause p r o s c r i p t i o n  aga ins t  prayer i n  t h e  
pub l i c  schools  i s  considered ..., t h e  p r o t e c t i o n s  of 
p o l i t i c a l  and r e l i g i o u s  speech...are inapposite. . . .  
I n  s h o r t ,  t hese  two v i t a l  d i s t i n c t i o n s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
t h e  s tuden t s '  f r e e  speech and a s s o c i a t i o n a l  r i g h t s ,  
cognizable i n  a  "publ ic  forum," a r e  severe ly  
circumscribed by t h e  Establishment Clause i n  t h e  
271 Goodwin v. /, supra (use  of 
p u b l i c a d d r e s s  system by s tuden t  counc i l  f o r  prayer and Bible reading 
each school day); C o l l i n s  v. Chandler Unif ied  School D i s t r i c t ,  664 FT 2d 
759 (9th  Ci r . ) ,  c e r t .  den. 102 S. C t .  322 (198l)(opening of school 
assemblies wi th  prayer by s tuden t  s e l e c t e d  by s tuden t  counc i l ) .  
281 Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School D i s t r i c t ,  13 
Cal. F t r .  43, 68 Cal. App. 3d 1 (Ct. App.), c e r t .  den. 434 U.S. 877 
T r i e t l e y  v. Board of Education of t h e  C i t y  of Buffa lo ,  65 A. D. 2d 1, 
N.Y. S. 2d 912 (App. Div. 1978); Brandon v. Board of Education of t h e  
Gui lder land Cen t ra l  School D i s t r i c t ,  635 F.- 
c e r t .  den. 102 S. C t .  970 (1981). 
public school setting. Because of the symbolic 
effect that prayer in the schools would produce, 
we find that Establishment Clause considerations 
must prevail in this context. Brandon v. Guilderland 
Central School District, supra, at 980 .  
Perhaps significantly, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case 
soon after it issued its contrary ruling in the public college context 
in Widmar v. Vincent, supra. 
In sum, then, state and lower federal court decisions have applied 
the religion clauses of the First Amendment in three contexts involving 
school prayer seemingly relevant to President Reagan's proposal but not 
yet definitively adjudicated by the Supreme Court. These courts have 
uniformly found no constitutional objection to government prescription 
of a moment of silence at the beginning of each school day or to 
baccalaureate services and commencement prayers offered in connection 
with graduation exercises. But they have found unconstitutional the 
use of secondary school facilities during the school day by student 
prayer and Bible study groups. While these rulings cannot be considered 
the final or definitive interpretations of the First Amendment in these 
29 I -
contexts, the unanimity of the courts that have addressed the issues 
provides, at the least, firm guidance on that interpretation. 
Court Decisions Involving Prayer in Public Institutions 
Other Than Schools: Because President Reagan's proposal concerns 
not only prayer in public schools but also prayer in "other public 
institutions," the legal context also includes interpretations of the 
First Amendment in public institutions other than schools. It is a 
well-established principle, for instance, that government is permitted 
2 9 1  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1  ( 1 9 5 8 ) .  -
and, perhaps, even obligated to make provision for religious exercises 
when individuals, as the result of government action, have been deprived 
or removed from their usual outlets for religious expression. This 
principle finds its most obvious application in the contexts of 
301 -
prisons and military service. As Justice Brennan summarized the 
principle in Abington: 
...( S)uch provisions may be assumed to contravene the Establishment 
Clause, yet be sustained on constitutional grounds as necessary to 
secure to the members of the Armed Forces and prisoners those rights 
of worship guaranteed under the Free Exercise Clause. Since 
government has deprived such persons of the opportunity to practice 
their faith at places of their choice..., government may, in order 
to avoid infringing the free exercise guarantees, provide 
substitutes where it requires such persons to be. 
...( H)ostility, not neutrality, would characterize the refusal 
to provide chaplains and places of worship for prisoners and 
soldiers cut off by the State from all civilian opportunities 
for public communion.... Abington School District v. Schempp, 
supra, at 297-299 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
In addition, state and lower federal courts have uniformly upheld 
the constitutionality of opening the meetings of state and local - 
311 -
legislative bodies with religious invocations. (This uniformity 
does not extend to the question of the constitutionality of paying a -
301 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972)(state prison held -
c o n s t ~ ~ t i o ~ ~  obligated to provide opportunities for religious 
expression by Buddhist inmate); Rudd v. Ray, 248 N.W. 2d 125 (Iowa 
1976)(provision of chaplains and chapels at public expense in state 
prison held constitutional); Theriault v. Silber 547 F. 2d 1279 
-9 
(5th Cir. 1977)(employment of chaplains in federal prisons held 
constitutional). 
311 Marsa v. Wernik, 86 N.J. 232, 430 A. 2d 888 (1981); 
chambers v. Marsh, 504 F. Supp. 585 (D. Neb. 1980); Voswinkel v. 
City of Charlotte, 495 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. N. Car. 1980); Bogen v. 
Doty, 598 F. 2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1979); Lincoln v. Page 109 N.H. -' 
30, 241 A. 2d 799 (1960). 
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s a l a r y  t o  l e g i s l a t i v e  chapla ins ,  however. ) The cour t s  have been 
/ 33 / -
wary i n  t h i s  conclus ion,  terming the  mat ter  a  p o t e n t i a l  "quagmire." 
But they,  nonetheless ,  have held the  purpose and primary e f f e c t  of 
such invoca t ions  t o  be t o  s e t  a  tone of solemnity f o r  the  l e g i s l a t i v e  
proceedings and, on the  f a c t s  before them, not t o  excess ive ly  entangle  
government wi th  r e l i g i o n .  
I n  o t h e r  con tex t s  not  s p e c i f i c a l l y  involving pub l i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
but  having some bear ing,  t h e  F i r s t  Amendment has been held t o  bar  
t h e  government from disseminat ing w r i t t e n  p rayers  o r  r equ i r ing  
i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  se rve  a s  bea re r s  of i t s  ideo log ica l  messages. I n  
34 / 
Wooley v. ~ a ~ n a r d  t h e  Court held  t h a t  a  s t a t e  cannot,  c o n s i s t e n t  
wi th  t h e  f r e e  e x e r c i s e  c lause ,  compel an ind iv idua l  t o  use l i c e n s e  
p l a t e s  bear ing an i d e o l o g i c a l  message t h a t  v i o l a t e s  the  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
35/ 
r e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s .  S imi la r ly ,  i n  - H a l l  v. ~radshaw- a  f e d e r a l  a p p e l l a t e  
c o u r t  he ld  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a  s t a t e ' s  inc lus ion  of a  "motor i s t ' s  prayer"  
on s t a t e  maps published and d i s t r i b u t e d  a t  pub l i c  expense. 
I n  sum, then,  o u t s i d e  of the  pub l i c  school context ,  t h e  r e l i g i o n  
c l a u s e s  of t h e  F i z s t  Amendment have been uniformly i n t e r p r e t e d  by t h e  
c o u r t s  t o  permit  government involvement with prayer i n  such pub l i c  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  a s  p r i sons ,  t h e  m i l i t a r y ,  and l e g i s l a t i v e  bodies,  but  t o  
bar  government sponsorship of prayers  on s t a t e  l i t e r a t u r e  o r  l i c e n s e  p l a t e s .  
32/ Compare Chambers v. Marsh, supra  (payments t o  s t a t e  l e g i s l a t i v e  
chap la in  and p r i n t i n g  of c h a p l a i n ' s  prayers  a t  pub l i c  expense held  
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l )  wi th  Colo v. Treasure r ,  378 Mass. 550, 392 N.E. 2d 1195 
(1979) ( s t a te  l e g i s l a t i v e  c h a p l a i n ' s  s a l a r y  held  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ) .  
33/  Bogen v. s, supra ,  a t  1114. -
34/ 430 U.S. 705 (1977). -
35/ 630 F. 2d 1018 (4th  C i r .  1980), c e r t .  den. 450 U.S. 965 (1981). -
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LEGAL EFFECT OF PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL 
As a constitutional amendment, of course, the President's proposal 
is not subject to any constitutional objection or question. The sole 
legal question is how the proposal, if adopted, would change existing 
interpretations of the Constitution and, more particularly, of the 
Fir st Amendment. 
(1) Effect on Interpretations of First Amendment Which Have Not 
Involved Prayer: At the outset, it should be noted that the President's 
proposal concerns only "individual or group prayer in public schools or 
other public buildings." Thus, it would appear to have no effect on 
other matters concerning government and religion that have been addressed 
in the decisions noted above. It would not appear, for instance to 
reverse the Court's decision in McCollum v. Board of Education, supra 
in which the Court held the establishment clause to bar the public 
schools from letting private teachers give religious instruction 
to consenting students during the school day on the school premises. 
It would appear to have no effect on the teaching of evolution 
in the public schools (Epperson v. Arkansas, supra). It would 
appear not to affect the Court's decision in Stone v. Graham 
-9 
supra, in which the Court held unconstitutional a state statute 
directing that wall plaques containing the Ten Commandments be 
hung on every schoolroom wall. Finally, and perhaps most important, 
it would appear not to affect that part of the Court's decision in 
Abington School District v. Schempp, and Murray v. Curlett, supra, 
CRS- 16 
in which the Court held the establishment clause to proscribe 
state sponsorship of devotional Bible reading in the public schools. 
The proposal focuses exclusively on "individual or group prayer." 
(2) Effect on Interpretations of First Amendment In Which Government 
Involvement With Prayer Has Been Upheld: Moreover, because the 
proposed amendment is stated in the negative--"Nothing in this 
Constitution shall be construed to prohibit..."-it also 
would appear to have no effect on those present interpretations 
of the First Amendment in which government accommodation of individual 
or group prayer has been found% to be prohibited. Thus, it 
would not alter the Supreme Court's decision in Zorach v. Clauson, 
supra, in which the Court held constitutional government accommodation of 
private religious exercises off the public elementary and secondary 
school grounds during the school day, nor the Court's decision in 
Widmar v. Vincent, supra, in which the Court held that public college 
students have a constitutional right to use campus facilities for 
group prayer to the same extent as they may use the facilities for 
non-religious purposes. Nor would the proposed language appear to 
affect the so-far uniform decisions of the state and lower federal courts 
which have held the First Amendment not to prohibit state prescription 
of periods of silence in the public schools or the holding of sectarian 
baccalaureate services and the inclusion of prayers in commencement 
ceremonies as part of high school graduation exercises. Nor would the 
proposed language appear to alter those decisions which have affirmed 
the constitutionality of government involvement with prayer in the 
contexts of prisons, the military, and legislative bodies. 
The President's proposal, in other words, would not alter existing 
interpretations of the First Amendment which either have not involved 
individual or group prayer or which have held government involvement 
with prayer to be permitted rather than prohibited. Its sole effect 
in this regard would be to reinforce those interpretations in 
which government involvement with prayer has been held to be permitted. 
(3) Effect on Interpretations of First Amendment Which Have Held 
Government Involvement With Prayer in Public Schools To Be Unconstitutional: 
The primary substantive effect of the proposal was stated by President 
Reagan in his accompanying message to be to "remove the bar to school 
prayer established by the Supreme Court and allow prayer back in our 
schools." However, it is not entirely certain that the language of the 
proposal is sufficient to accomplish this result. Each of the judicial 
decisions which have involved prayer in the public schools has framed the 
constitutional question not in terms of the permissibility of the activity 
itself but in terms of the permissibility of government's sponsorship of, 
or involvement with, that activity. That is, in Engel the Court 
interpreted the establishment clause to mean not that prayer is 
unconstitutional but that "in this country it is no part of the business 
36 I -




the Court emphasized that "the concept of neutrality" 
the First Amendment "does not permit a State to require 
exercise even with the consent of the majority ...." 
37 / -
(emphasis added). In Brandon a federal appellate court identified 
361 Engel, supra, at 425.  
371 Abington, supra, at 225 .  -
t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n f i r m i t y  t o  be not  the  s t u d e n t - i n i t i a t e d  group 
p rayer  a c t i v i t y  i t s e l f  but  the  "appearance ... t h a t  the  s t a t e  has placed 
38 / -
i t s  imprimatur on a  p a r t i c u l a r  r e l i g i o u s  creed. .  . ." (emphasis added). 
Yet t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  proposal  speaks not  i n  terms of government involvement 
wi th  prayer  i n  t h e  pub l i c  schools  but  i n  terms of the  a c t i v i t y  i t s e l f ,  
t h a t  i s ,  " ind iv idua l  o r  group prayer." Thus, the  language of t h e  
proposal ,  i f  read l i t e r a l l y ,  leaves  some doubt t h a t  i t  reaches and 
r e v e r s e s  those  j u d i c i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of the  F i r s t  Amendment which 
have held  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  government sponsorship o f ,  o r  o the r  involvement 
w i t h ,  p rayer  i n  t h e  pub l i c  schools.  
An i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h a t  the  proposal  does not reach and reverse  such 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,  of course ,  would seem i n c o n s i s t e n t  with i t s  s t a t e d  i n t e n t .  
The Pres iden t  i n  h i s  accompanying statement made c l e a r  h i s  i n t e n t  t o  
"remove t h e  ba r  t o  school prayer e s t a b l i s h e d  by the  Supreme Court and 
a l low prayer  back i n  our schools" (though he d id  so  without mentioning 
o r  c i t i n g  t h e  Supreme Court d e c i s i o n ( s )  t h a t  he would change). Senator 
Thurmond, i n  in t roducing the  proposal  as  S.  J. Res. 199, c i t e d  Engel 
a s  a l t e r i n g  the  o r i g i n a l  meaning of the  es tabl ishment  c lause  and 
desc r ibed  t h e  proposal  a s  intended t o  " r e i n s t a t e ( )  the  o r i g i n a l  i n t e n t  
of t h e  Founding Fathers  and permit ( )  ind iv idua l  and group prayer i n  
39 / -
p u b l i c  schools  o r  o t h e r  Government-owned i n s t i t u t i o n s . . . . "  Moreover, 
t h e  second sentence  of t h e  proposal--"No person s h a l l  be required by 
t h e  United S t a t e s  o r  by any S t a t e  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  prayerw-seems t o  
381  Brandon v. Board of Education of Gui lder land School D i s t r i c t ,  -
supra ,  a t  978. 
391  128 Cong. Rec. S5428 (May 18, 1982)(dai ly  ed . ) .  -
imply that some government role is contemplated by the first sentence 
of the proposal. 
The point simply is that without resort to such ancillary sources 
regarding the intent of the proposal (and to additional legislative 
history that may be developed in the future as the proposal is considered), 
the language of the first sentence of the proposal leaves some ambiguity 
as to its effective scope. (In this connection it might also be noted 
that it is not unknown for legislative enactments to be judicially 
interpreted in one manner notwithstanding strong indications to the 
40/ -
contrary in the enactments' legislative histories. ) 
Nonetheless, if the proposal were construed, as seems likely, 
to legitimize government sponsorship of prayer in the public schools 
and other public buildings, some ambiguity still remains. As can be 
seen in the decisions cited in the foregoing section, government 
involvement with prayer in the public schools has come in a variety 
of forms. In Engel a government body itself composed a prayer and 
41 1 . --
recommended its recital by teachers and students. In Abington 
and Murray governmental bodies provided for the unison recital of the 
Lord's Prayer. In Brandon and Huntington Beach the proposed student 
prayer groups apparently involved only students, but in Trietley the 
program was initiated by a local minister and provided for the 
participation of a teacher as well as students. Other cases show 
401 E.g., N.L .R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490 
(1980); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
41/ The prayer composed by the New York Board of Regents was as 
follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we 
beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country." 
42 / 
other forms: In the recent case of Karen B. v.  ree en- teachers were 
authorized to ask whether any student wished to offer a prayer and, if 
no student volunteered, to offer their own prayers. In Collins v. 
Chandler Unified School District, supra, the student council, with the 
approval of school officials, selected students to open student assemblies 
with prayer. Another case involved daily opening assemblies in which, 
at school board direction, a student read the chaplain's "remarks" from 
43 / -
the Congressional Record. Given this variety in past forms of 
government involvement with prayer in the public schools--forms which 
have been held unconstitutional under the establishment clause, the 
question arises whether the President's proposal would legitimize all, 
or only some, of these forms of involvement and, if only some, which 
ones. Again, the future legislative history of the proposal may 
clarify this matter. 
(4) Effect on Government Involvement With Prayer in "Other Public 
Institutions": As worded, the President's proposal concerns 
individual and group prayer not only in the public schools but 
also in "other public institutions," without limitation. Thus, 
its potential substantive scope appears considerably broader than 
just school prayer. 
42/ 653 F. 2d897 (5thCir. 1981), aff'dmem. 102 S. Ct. 
1267 (1982). 
43/ State Board of Education v. Board of Education of Netcong, 
New ~ z s e ~ ,  108 N.J. Sup. 586, 262 A. 2d 21, aff'd 57 N.J. 172, 270 
A. 2d 412 (1970), cert. den. 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). 
Again, however, the nature of its effect on the legal status of 
prayer in public institutions other than the schools appears to depend 
on whether, and the extent to which, a concept of government sponsorship 
is read into the proposal. If no concept of government sponsorship is 
read into its language, it would appear not to alter existing law in 
this regard. If a narrow concept of government sponsorship is read into 
it, the proposal might do no more than reinforce those existing 
interpretations of the First Amendment which have upheld some 
government involvement with prayer in prisons, the military, and 
legislative assemblies. If, on the other hand, an expansive concept 
of government sponsorship is read into the proposal, it might 
legitimate government sponsorship of prayer opportunities for 
public employees on the job, for visitors to museums, or for applicants 
for public assistance. 
If, as the statements of the President and the proposal's 
Senate sponsor indicate, the proposal is intended to legitimate 
some government involvement with prayer in the public schools, 
the same logically would seem true regarding government involvement 
with prayer in other public institutions. But at this point in 
its legislative consideration, the proposal appears ambiguous 
on the intended scope of this involvement. 
(5) Effect of Second Sentence of Proposal: Finally, it might be 
noted that the second sentence of the President's proposal--"No person 
shall be required by the United States or by any State to participate 
in prayerw--appears not to change existing iaw. Present interpretations 
of the First Amendment hold that the government has no power to compel 
any person to declare a religious belief or to participate in exercises 
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i n v o l v i n g  a f f i r m a t i o n s  c o n t r a r y  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  b e l i e f .  The e f f e c t  o f  
t h e  second s e n t e n c e ,  t h u s ,  appears  t o  be t o  make c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  
s e n t e n c e  does  n o t  a l t e r  t h i s  p r i n c i p l e .  
PAST CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
Since  t h e  Supreme Cour t ' s  d e c i s i o n s  i n  1962 and 1963 i n  Engel  and 
Abington,  e v e r y  Congress  has  w i tnes sed  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of numerous 
451 -
p r o p o s a l s  t o  amend t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  t h i s  i s s u e .  
The Senate  has  voted  tw ice  on such p r o p o s a l s ,  t h e  House once. 
I n  1966 Sen. Di rksen  (R- I l l . )  o f f e r e d  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  amendment 
on p r a y e r  a s  a  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  a  pending j o i n t  r e s o l u t i o n  t o  d e s i g n a t e  
October  3 1  of  each  y e a r  a s  "Na t iona l  UNICEF Day." The o p e r a t i v e  p a r t  
o f  h i s  amendment provided  as fo l lows :  
Nothing con ta ined  i n  t h i s  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h a l l  p r o h i b i t  
t h e  a u t h o r i t y  a d m i n i s t e r i n g  any schoo l ,  s choo l  system, 
e d u c a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  o r  o t h e r  p u b l i c  b u i l d i n g  
suppor t ed  i n  whole o r  i n  p a r t . t h r o u g h  t h e  expend i tu re  
o f  p u b l i c  funds  from p rov id ing  f o r  o r  p e r m i t t i n g  t h e  
v o l u n t a r y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by s t u d e n t s  o r  o t h e r s  i n  p raye r .  
Nothing con ta ined  i n  t h i s  a r t i c l e  s h a l l  a u t h o r i z e  any 
such  a u t h o r i t y  t o  p r e s c r i b e  t h e  form o r  c o n t e n t  of  any 
p raye r .  
Sen. Bayh (D-Ind.) i n  t u r n  proposed a s  a  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  t h e  Dirksen  
p roposa l  a s e n s e  of  t h e  Congress r e s o l u t i o n  i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  Supreme 
C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n s  a s  c o n t i n u i n g  t o  pe rmi t  moments of " s i l e n t ,  v o l u n t a r y  
441 Torcaso  v. Watkins,  367 U.S. 488 (1961); West V i r g i n i a  Board of  
~ d u c a z o n  v. B a r n e t t e ,  319 U.S. 624 (1943); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 
705 (1977).  
451  With in  t h r e e  days  of t h e  Engel r u l i n g ,  more t han  f i t y  
proposed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  amendments had been in t roduced ,  and by t h e  
end of t h e  8 8 t h  Congress ,  a f t e r  Abington, no re  t han  one hundred f i f t y  
had been o f f e r e d .  I n  t h e  p r e s e n t  Congress, i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  
p r o p o s a l s ,  t e n  o t h e r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  amendments r e l a t i n g  t o  p raye r  
have been introduced--House J o i n t  Reso lu t ions  24, 30, 69,  123, 126, 
132, 135, 164, 170, and 311. 
praye r  o r  med i t a t ion"  i n  t h e  schools .  A f t e r  e x t e n s i v e  d e b a t e ,  t h e  
Sena te  r e j e c t e d  t h e  Bayh s u b s t i t u t e ,  33-52, and then  approved 
s u b s t i t u t i n g  t h e  t e x t  of t h e  Dirksen proposa l  f o r  t h e  pending j o i n t  
r e s o l u t i o n ,  51-36. On t h e  c r u c i a l  v o t e  on f i n a l  passage ,  however, 
t h e  Senate  voted  on ly  49-37 i n  f a v o r ,  n i n e  v o t e s  s h o r t  of t h e  n e c e s s a r y  
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two- th i rds  m a j o r i t y .  
I n  1970 a p raye r  amendment su r f aced  unexpectedly i n  connect ion  
w i t h  t h e  S e n a t e ' s  deba te  on t h e  proposed Equal  R igh t s  Amendment. Sen. 
Baker (R-Tenn.) proposed as an  amendment t o  t h e  pending ERA t h e  fo l lowing:  
Nothing con ta ined  i n  t h i s  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h a l l  ab r idge  
t h e  r i g h t  of  persons  l a w f u l l y  assembled, i n  any p u b l i c  
b u i l d i n g  which i s  suppor ted  i n  whole o r  i n  p a r t  through 
t h e  expend i tu re  of p u b l i c  funds,  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  
nondenominational p raye r .  
A f t e r  b r i e f  debate  t h e  Senate  added t h i s  amendment t o  t h e  ERA by a v o t e  of 
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50-20. T h i s  v o t e  was widely perce ived ,  however, a s  a  v o t e  no t  on t h e  
m e r i t s  of  t h e  p raye r  i s s u e  bu t  a s  p a r t  of a  s t r a t e g y  t o  so  encumber t h e  
ERA w i t h  ext raneous  m a t t e r s  t h a t  i t s  s u p p o r t e r s  would l e t  i t  d i e .  When 
t h e  Senate  a l s o  added an  amendment t o  t h e  ERA exempting women from t h e  
d r a f t ,  t h i s  s t r a t e g y  was s u c c e s s f u l .  Thus, both  t h e  ERA and t h e  amendments 
added t o  i t  went no f u r t h e r  i n  t h a t  Congress. 
The con t rove r sy  over  government-sponsored p raye r  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  s choo l s  
d i d  no t  r e s u l t  i n  a  House v o t e  u n t i l  1971. The b i l l  t h a t  became t h e  focus  of  
House a c t i o n  i n  t h a t  y e a r  was H.J. Res. 191, sponsored by Rep. Wylie (R-Ohio), 
46/  See 112 Cong. Rec. 23063-23084, 23122-23147, 23155-23163, 
23202-23207, and 23531-23556 (1966). 
47/  For t h e  deba te  and v o t e  on t h e  p raye r  amendment, s e e  116 -
Cong. Rec. S36478-S36505 (Oct. 13, 1970).  
which was i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  Baker amendment noted above. Because the  House 
J u d i c i a r y  Committee refused t o  r e p o r t  any of the  proposed b i l l s  on the  prayer 
i s s u e  t h a t  were r e f e r r e d  t o  i t ,  the  suppor ters  of the  Wylie amendment 
r e s o r t e d  t o  t h e  l i t t l e - u s e d  t a c t i c  of a d ischarge  p e t i t i o n ,  which permits a 
ma jo r i ty  of t h e  House (218 members) t o  d ischarge  a committee from 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of a b i l l  i f  the  b i l l  has been pending before i t  f o r  
30 days o r  more. l l f t e r  an extensive  lobbying and grass- roots  
campaign by such groups as  t h e  Prayer  Campaign Committee, the  Back 
t o  God movement, and t h e  National  Associat ion of Evangel ica ls ,  t h e  
d i scharge  p e t i t i o n  on Sept.  21, 1971, obta ined t h e  r e q u i s i t e  218 
s i g n a t u r e s  t o  b r ing  t h e  Wylie amendment d i r e c t l y  t o  the  f l o o r  of t h e  
House f o r  a vote .  
Because House r u l e s  prevented an immediate vote  on the  i s s u e ,  
481 -
however, t h e  debate  and vo te  d id  not  occur u n t i l  November 8,  g iv ing 
both proponents and opponents of t h e  Wylie b i l l  time t o  mount i n t e n s i v e  
lobbying and grass- roots  campaigns. On November 8 t h e  House e a s i l y  
adopted t h e  p e t i t i o n  t o  d ischarge  t h e  Jud ic ia ry  Committee from f u r t h e r  
cons ide ra t ion  of H.J .  Res. 191, 242-157. A f t e r  lengthy debate the 
House then adopted by voice  vo te  an amendment o f fe red  by Rep. 
Buchanan (D-Ala.) s u b s t i t u t i n g  the  word "voluntary" f o r  "nondenominational" 
and adding "meditat ion" a s  a permiss ib le  activi ty--an amendment t h a t  
i t s  sponsors thought would answer the  primary arguments aga ins t  the  
r e s o l u t i o n  and would e l imina te  the  danger t h a t  a S t a t e  might p r e s c r i b e  
481 The r u l e s  required t h a t  a d ischarge  p e t i t i o n ,  once the  
r e q u i s i t e  number of s i g n a t u r e s  had been obtained,  had t o  wai t  seven 
days before  being brought before  the  House, and then could be considered 
only  on t h e  second o r  f o u r t h  Monday of the  month. Coupled with the  House's 
ho l iday  observance schedule,  these  requirements meant t h a t  the  b i l l  could 
no t  be considered before  November 8. 
